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Antebellum Period: A Survey 
and New Evidence 
Robert A. Margo 
Data on wages and prices are fundamental to the study of the economy of the 
United States before the Civil War. Even economic historians who are unwill- 
ing to employ a real wage index-the  ratio of wages to a weighted average of 
prices-as  a summary statistic of  the standard of  living or the rate of eco- 
nomic growth (Engerman and Gallman 1983; Fogel 1986) agree that evidence 
on wages and prices should be compiled and assessed. The extent to which 
levels and trends in real wages varied across occupations and regions provides 
valuable information on levels and trends in inequality, and on the spatial in- 
tegration of labor markets.' Evidence on long-run trends in real wages is also 
useful for cross-country comparisons (see Jeffrey G. Williamson's comment 
on this paper). 
The short-run behavior of wages and prices is also of interest. In the long 
run, one might expect that real wages are determined by real forces-the  de- 
mand and supply of labor. In the short run, there may be persistent effects of 
nominal or real shocks (for example, immigration, technological change) on 
nominal wages, leading to short-run fluctuations. Whether a wage lag existed 
prior to the Civil War and, if  so, what role the lag played in macroeconomic 
fluctuations, are unsettled issues. Although economic historians have largely 
focused on long-run trends, short-run fluctuations have commanded the atten- 
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tion of social, labor, and political historians (Hirsch 1978; Wilentz 1984; Ross 
1985; Fogel 1989, 1990). 
This paper surveys recent research on antebellum wages and prices and 
presents some new evidence on real wages. Section 4.1 briefly discusses some 
of the problems involved in using real wages as a proxy for living standards. 
Section 4.2 reviews recent research; it concludes that, while progress has been 
made in investigating nominal wage patterns during the antebellum period, 
further insights require additional research on prices, particularly at the retail 
level. Section 4.3 discusses a new data source on antebellum wages, based on 
military records, which is used in conjunction with previously collected data 
on wholesale prices to chart region- and occupation-specific movements in 
real wages from 1821 to 1856. Section 4.4 compares the new estimates of real 
wages to earlier estimates, concluding that previous work has overstated real 
wage growth in  the  1830s and understated real wage declines in  the early 
1850s. Section 4.5 presents evidence on regional real wage gaps in the North, 
finding that real wages were higher in the Midwest and that population redis- 
tribution raised the northern growth rate above the regional rates. Section 4.6 
examines fluctuations in real wages, concluding that “shocks” had persistent 
effects. A summary is presented in section 4.7. 
4.1  Real Wages and the Standard of Living 
Economists use real wage indices to measure short- and long-run move- 
ments in the standard of living. Such analyses, particularly for historical econ- 
omies like the antebellum United States, pose well-known problems of mea- 
surement and interpretation.2  With respect to measurement, the major issues 
concern the payment period and variations in  wages and prices around the 
mean or mode. 
Ideally the numerator of a real wage index should reflect annual earnings- 
the product of a wage rate (hourly or daily) times the amount of time worked 
per year. Annual wages are preferable to hourly or daily wages because the 
former implicitly adjust for fluctuations in unemployment or long-run trends 
in time worked per year. An ideal index is comprehensive: it recognizes that, 
historically (as well as today), wages, prices, and  consumption patterns as 
reflected in budget shares (used in the construction of price deflators) differ 
across the population. A narrowly defined real wage index (for example, ma- 
sons employed in urban areas in the northeastern United States) may accu- 
rately represent aggregate trends if wage differentials are unchanging in the 
short and long run, but there is no good reason to assume this was ever true 
for any historical economy. Provided enough detail is available on the distri- 
2. For useful discussions of some of the problems, see David and Solar (1977) and the various 
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bution of  wages, prices, budget shares, and the relevant population weights 
(the proportion of masons employed in the Northeast), the construction of an 
aggregate index of real wages is straightforward, if  computationally burden- 
some. 
Assuming these measurement problems can be  solved, there is a larger 
question: what does a real wage index mean? Economically speaking, a real 
wage  index is supposed to represent an  individual worker’s “budget con- 
straint”; if the constraint moves outward (real wages increase), the worker is 
“better-off  .” However, even if  the index is comprehensive as previously de- 
fined, it may be a poor representation of the budget constraint. At best, a real 
wage index can measure only the budget constraints of wage workers: the self- 
employed and owners of capital are excluded. Just as it is not wise to assume 
that wage trends for a narrowly defined population group mimic the average, 
it is not wise to assume that trends in incomes of the nonwage labor force 
closely resembled real wage movements. In many historical economies wages 
were a small share of workers’ total compensation: they were paid in kind, or 
were paid by the piece, not by a money wage per unit of time. Such payments 
should be included in a real wage index; in practice, it may be difficult to find 
reliable data. Individuals spend all or part of  their working lives as part of 
households in which other members may contribute income. Thus an individ- 
ual’s consumption possibilities may differ drastically from his or her earnings 
as a wage worker. 
Subtle issues of  interpretation involve the relationship between real wage 
growth and economic development. According to some scholars, the intro- 
duction of the factory system led to deleterious changes in work organization 
and increasing intensity of  work. To  accept these changes, workers required 
higher real wages; unadjusted for them, real wage indices overstate the degree 
to which economic welfare was rising. Rapid urbanization in the nineteenth 
century, which was associated with industrialization, led to reductions in nu- 
tritional status and health, at the same time that real wages may have been 
increasing (Fogel 1986). 
As will become apparent as the paper unfolds, research on the antebellum 
United States is far from meeting these ideals. With the exception of Leber- 
gott (1964), Adams (1982), and Sokoloff (1986b), most studies have exam- 
ined daily wages, not annual earnings, despite evidence that the length of the 
work year not only differed between agriculture and manufacturing but also 
increased over time in the nonfarm sector (Gallman 1975; Adams 1986). In 
addition, there is indirect evidence that annual fluctuations in the length of the 
work year were significant (Keyssar 1986; Goldin and Margo 1992). Little is 
3. “Straightforward is meant in a practical sense, not in the sense that all problems associated 
with the construction of real wage indices can be solved in a believable fashion. Even if the wage 
and price data were ideal, there still would be the classic index number problem of valuing new 
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known about the effects of personal characteristics  (for example, literacy, age, 
work experience, ethnicity) on wages.4 Although evidence is mounting that 
health and nutritional status deteriorated in the late antebellum period at the 
same time that real wages were rising (Margo and Steckel 1983; Fogel 1986), 
there has been little work at reconciling these different measures of  living 
standards, or at measuring the impact of  changing working conditions and 
work intensity on wages. 
Lest this discussion seem too pessimistic, my opinion is that the situation 
is not hopeless. There is a (very) long historiographic tradition of using real 
wages as a proxy for living standards, and tradition counts for something. 
Data on wages and prices are useful for many purposes, not just to construct 
proxies for economic welfare. As recent work on the British industrial revo- 
lution has demonstrated (Lindert and Williamson 1983), none of the problems 
are intractable; what is really needed in the American case is a great deal more 
evidence. With that goal in mind, I now turn to a survey of previous work on 
antebellum wages and prices. 
4.2  Antebellum Wages and Prices: A Survey 
4.2.1  Wages 
Except in  a few scattered years, no  comprehensive national surveys of 
American wages were taken before the Civil War. In their place scholars have 
turned  to  late-nineteenth-century documents containing retrospective  evi- 
dence and to archival records. Although this effort has yielded a significant 
amount of  valuable information, there are still major gaps in  the historical 
record. 
The most famous compilations of wages for the nineteenth-century United 
States are two federal government documents: the Weeks report, published as 
part of  the 1880 census (Weeks 1886); and the Aldrich report, published in 
conjunction with a Senate investigation in  the early  1890s (Aldrich 1893). 
The two reports differ somewhat in  detail, but their basic structures are the 
same: both were collected from payroll records of  firms, and both are refro- 
specrive surveys-the  data are time series of wages paid by firms that existed 
at the time of the ~urvey.~  Because many of the firms in the surveys had been 
in business for many years, one can use either report to estimate time series 
going back well into the nineteenth century (Abbott 1905; Hansen 1925). The 
4. Gender is an exception; see Goldin and Sokoloff (1982) and Adam  (1986). 
5. Some firms had been in business longer than others, and one can study whether the length of 
time firms were in business affects the calculation of, for example, real wage changes. Suppose 
one is studying wage growth between (say)  1870 and 1880. By varying which firms are in the 
sample (i.e.,  only firms in existence for those ten years,  versus those in existence prior to the 
187Os), one can gauge the importance of the length of time firms were in business. But one cannot 
study how firms that came into existence prior to either survey and failed to survive until 1880  or 
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best-known modem studies based wholly or in part on either report are David 
and Solar (1977) and Williamson and Lindert (1980). In both sources wages 
are disaggregated by firm (thus industry), occupation, and frequency of pay- 
ment (daily or hourly), but the Weeks  report does not give the number of 
observations  underlying the firm averages. 
Although a fairly convincing case can be made that either report can be 
used to study late-nineteenth-century wage movements, their usefulness in 
studying antebellum patterns is another matter, particularly before 1850. The 
numbers of observations per year declines very sharply before 1840 (for ex- 
ample, for common labor between 1830 and 1832 the Weeks report contains 
one observation). Although it is unclear a priori whether the selection induced 
by  retrospectiveness produces bias, selectivity is potentially a problem be- 
cause the number of firms with antebellum data is small. The antebellum data 
pertain almost solely to the Northeast; little can be gleaned from either report 
about wages in the Midwest or the South, at least prior to the 1850s. 
Partly in response to the inadequacies of both surveys and partly for other 
reasons, economic historians have turned to archival records. One such study 
is Walter B. Smith’s (1963) well-known compilation of wages paid on the Erie 
Canal. Drawing on canal payroll records, Smith constructed annual estimates 
of the nominal and real daily wages of common laborers, carpenters, masons, 
and “teamwork” on the canal from 1828 to 1881.’ In addition to Smith, im- 
portant archival contributions have  been  made by Layer (1953, Lebergott 
(1964), Zabler (1972), Adams (1968, 1970, 1982, 1986), Sokoloff (1986b), 
and Rothenberg (1988). Layer used firm payrolls to construct estimates of 
wages for textile manufacturing workers beginning in the late 1830s. Leber- 
gott pulled together wage estimates for various occupations from a wide array 
of government documents and even presented a long time series of seamen’s 
wages but stopped short of constructing an annual index of real wages (Leber- 
gott  1964,  150, provides educated guesses at real  wage movements over 
medium-length periods, such as 1835 to 1850). Zabler used firm records to 
estimate occupation-specific  wages in the iron industry in rural Pennsylvania 
from 1800 to 1830. 
Without question the most prolific scholar in this area has been Donald 
Adams. In his  1968 and  1970 papers Adams used account books and firm 
records to estimate occupation-specific nominal wages in Philadelphia from 
1780 to 1830. Adams also used wholesale prices for Philadelphia to construct 
indices of  real wages over the same period. Adams (1982) used business 
records to estimate daily and annual earnings of manufacturing and farm labor 
6.  Early work favored the Aldrich report on these grounds (Abbott 1905) but Lebergott (1964) 
worked instead with the Weeks data, arguing that its coverage was better and it was less affected 
by sampling variability. 
7. Smith’s estimates are modes, not means, which complicates comparisons with other studies 
as well as any time-series analysis of the Erie Canal data (i.e., the mode is more stable than the 
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in  the Brandywine region around Philadelphia from 1800 to 1860. He con- 
cluded  that,  while  there  were  substantial long-run increases in  real  daily 
wages and annual earnings, there were also significant short-run fluctuations. 
He also found rather large wage gaps between agriculture and manufacturing, 
suggesting that the sectoral shift of labor out of farming raised per capita in- 
come (later I discuss an analogous effect involving interregional migration). 
Adams (1986) presents estimates of wages of farm labor for Maryland from 
1750 to  1850, finding an ubsence of real wage growth for farm labor from 
roughly 1820 to 1850. 
Using the 1832 McLane report and the manuscript schedules of the federal 
manufacturing censuses of 1820, 1850, and 1860, Sokoloff (1986b) estimated 
average annual earnings of  manufacturing workers at four benchmark dates. 
In  addition to finding large increases in nominal and real earnings, Sokoloff 
also discovered a narrowing of urban-rural wage gaps in the Northeast, sug- 
gesting an improvement in the spatial efficiency of labor markets. Rothenberg 
(1988) mined account books to estimate nominal and real wages of farm labor 
in Massachusetts from 1750 to 1855. Like Sokoloff, Rothenberg also found 
evidence of an improvement in the spatial efficiency of farm labor markets. 
These various studies illustrate the pluses and minuses of archival evidence, 
Use of  archival records  solves the problem of  retrospectiveness. Archival 
records may contain great detail on the characteristics of workers and jobs, 
which  is necessary for constructing  wage  estimates free of  compositional 
changes over time or for regression studies of the cross-sectional determinants 
of wages (for example, Margo and Villaflor 1987). Unfortunately, the archival 
records that have been examined to date typically have pertained to a single 
employer or a small number of employers located in the Northeast.  While 
further work  on the Northeast would be valuable, archival research would 
make the greatest contribution by  shifting attention to the Midwest or the 
South. 
4.2.2  Prices 
Antebellum data on prices have received less attention recently by  eco- 
nomic historians. The major exceptions are Rothenberg (1979), who presents 
a price index for rural Massachusetts, and Adams (1986), who provides evi- 
dence on meat and grain prices in Maryland. Although much is known about 
wholesale prices in a few key markets, very little is known about retail prices. 
Available evidence on both is discussed in turn (see also Hoover 1958). 
Wholesale prices. Relatively early in American history wholesale markets de- 
veloped in several ports and inland cities located on navigable waterways. The 
activities of  these markets generated an abundance of  price quotations in 
newspapers, in documents known as “Prices Current,” and in government and 
firm records (Hoover 1958). A vast number of quotations were compiled by 
Benzanson, Cole, Warren, and Pearson,  and their various associates (Cole 179  Wages and Prices during the Antebellum Period 
1938). From these data wholesale price indices for New York, Philadelphia, 
Charleston,  and  Cincinnati were  constructed (U.S.  Bureau  of  the  Census 
1975). Because the wholesale price data are of high quality (compared with 
quantity data from the period), inferences about antebellum business cycles 
have frequently been gleaned from their annual movements (Smith and Cole 
1935). 
The general trend in wholesale prices before 1860 is well-known. Although 
long-term drift was downward (at least from the early  182Os),  short-term 
movements were highly variable. Prices rose in the mid-l830s, peaked in the 
late 1830s, and then declined sharply during the early 1840s. The next big 
upward surge in prices occurred in the early 1850s, followed again by a de- 
cline. Perhaps the major exception to a long-term downward drift occurred in 
the Midwest. Improvements in internal transportation caused the Midwest to 
experience a long-term rise in its terms of trade-prices  of agricultural goods 
produced in the Midwest rose relative to the price of  nonagricultural goods 
(Berry 1943). Although the improvement in the terms of trade raised the in- 
comes of midwestern farmers, it appears to have hurt nonfarm workers in the 
region,  who  produced  substitutes  for  nonfarm  goods  imported  from  the 
Northeast and for whom food was a major item of  household budgets. Real 
wages in the Midwest grew less rapidly before the Civil War than in the North- 
east, in part because of the terms of trade effect (Ross 1985; Margo and Vil- 
laflor 1987). 
Studies of real wages have frequently used wholesale price data to construct 
price deflators (Hansen 1925; Adams 1968; Williamson and Lindert 1980). 
The major problems in doing so are discussed later. For now,  I would note 
that, although the cities covered by the wholesale data were the major whole- 
sale markets, they were far from being the only wholesale markets. Thus, for 
example, using New York price data to deflate nominal wages in Syracuse or 
Albany (the Erie Canal) presumes that markets in the two locations were spa- 
tially integrated. Rothenberg’s (1981) finding of a strong positive correlation 
between her price index for rural Massachusetts and wholesale prices in New 
York City and Philadelphia suggests this assumption is not totally unreason- 
able, at least for markets in close geographic proximity. However, it remains 
to be seen if the assumption is valid for other parts of the country, such as the 
Midwest or the South. 
Retail prices. Compared with wholesale price data, antebellum data on retail 
prices are sparse. Virtually all attempts to construct an antebellum cost-of- 
living index based on retail prices have relied on T.  M. Adams’s (1939) pio- 
neering study of prices paid by Vermont farmers. Although Adams’s study is 
valuable, there are serious (and well-known) problems with the Vermont data. 
Foods consumed by working-class nonfarm households are not covered in the 
Vermont data. The Vermont data show  a steep long-term downward trend 
from the early 1820s that some scholars (Lebergott 1964) believe to be exag- 180  Robert A. Margo 
gerated. Price deflators based on the Vermont data thus might be expected to 
produce relatively large increases in real wages, at least compared with defla- 
tors based on wholesale prices (see section 4.4). 
Other significant contributions have been made by  Brady (1966) and Hoo- 
ver (1960). Using data compiled originally by the Massachusetts Department 
of Labor and by herself from Pennsylvania account books and store records, 
Brady calculated average retail prices for a large number of  goods for six 
benchmark dates:  1809, 1834, 1836, 1839, 1844, and  1849. Based on data 
from the Weeks report, Hoover (1960) constructed a retail price index cover- 
ing the period  1851 to 1880, later extending the index back to  1800 (U.S. 
Bureau of the Census 1975). 
David and Solar (1977) used the Vermont data, Brady’s benchmark figures, 
Hoover’s index, and wholesale prices from Philadelphia to construct a cost- 
of-living index going back to 1774. Because neither the Vermont data nor 
Brady provided evidence on housing prices, David and  Solar constructed a 
proxy for annual reproduction costs of housing, using data on common labor 
wages and building materials prices. David and Solar’s index (1821 to 1986) 
is plotted in figure 4.1. 
Although carefully constructed from the available evidence, the David- 
Solar index has serious limitations. To  fill the gaps between Brady’s bench- 
mark dates, David and Solar interpolated using the Vermont data. The inter- 
polation was trend-corrected (adjusted for the different long-run trends in the 
Vermont and Brady’s data), but it is unclear whether the Vermont data should 
be used for this purpose (see section 4.4).  The David-Solar index is a hybrid 
between a northeastern (pre-1850) and a national (post-1850) price index. 
Thus, while it may be used to deflate nominal wages for the Northeast (at least 
before 1850) using it to deflate wage estimates for other regions is dubious, 
especially in light of known regional differences in  wholesale price trends 
(Berry 1943). 
The most serious problem with the David-Solar index is its proxy for hous- 
ing costs. David and Solar justify their proxy by  arguing that most housing 
during the period depreciated very rapidly (for example, the balloon-frame 
house). Consequently, an index of annual reproduction costs would appear to 
be appropriate. Even if this assumption were tenable, the adequacy of a proxy 
based on common laborers’ wages and building materials remains to be dem- 
onstrated (see David and Solar 1977, 45-46,  for an attempt to do so). How- 
ever, much of the wage data for the Northeast pertains to urban locations, or 
to locations where housing was of a more permanent nature. There is consid- 
erable qualitative evidence that rental prices of housing deviated from repro- 
duction costs in the short run, particularly during periods of high immigration 
(Lebergott 1964; Fogel 1989; Blackmar 1989). There is also evidence that the 
rental component of  Hoover’s price index grossly understates increases in 
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Fig. 4.1  David-Solar price index (1860 = 100) 
Source: David and Solar (1977). 
Manning 1992). Thus the usefulness of David and Solar’s proxy for housing 
costs is questionable. 
4.3  Civilian Wage Data in Military Records 
Since its inception the U.S.  Army has hired civilians to perform various 
tasks at military installations.*  Quartermasters  were responsible for the hiring, 
and they also were required to keep duplicate monthly records, one copy of 
which was eventually sent to Washington. Extent civilian payrolls covering 
the period 18  18 to 1905 are called the Reports of  Persons and Articles Hired 
and are currently lodged at the National Archives in Record Group 92. A large 
sample of payrolls covering the period 1818 to 1856 has been collected and 
put on computer tape (Margo and Villaflor 1987). The unit of observation is a 
“person-month-for  example, if  a man was  hired as a teamster for three 
months at $15 per month, he contributes three observations to the sample. 
Because the army was charged with forging a path to the frontier, the com- 
position of the Reports sample with respect to location, timing, and occupa- 
tion differs from what a purely random sample of the antebellum population 
would yield (Margo and Villaflor 1987, 875-76).  For example, frontier loca- 
tions-the  west North Central and west South Central regions-are  overrep- 
8. In addition to data on civilian wages at army installations, there are considerable wage data 
for arsenals and naval yards; see Heppner and John (1968). 182  Robert A. Margo 
resented. The number of observations per decade is generally large, except 
in  the  1820s and in the Northeast and South Atlantic regions in the  1850s. 
Although most of the tasks civilian workers performed had their counterparts 
in the civilian economy, occupations in the building trades (and clerical occu- 
pations) are overrepresented relative to the civilian population. 
Perhaps the most serious problem with the Reports is whether the army paid 
competitive wages. The forts were not competitive firms. Quartermasters had 
few incentives to hire the best workers at the lowest cost. This issue can be 
investigated by comparing wages at the forts with wages in the same location 
from purely civilian records. Based on comparisons made thus far, it appears 
that wages at the forts were similar in level to purely civilian wages (Margo 
and Villaflor 1987, 877). I stress this conclusion is a limited one. Systematic 
comparisons have been made only for a few locations (for example, upstate 
New York forts and the Erie Canal) or for isolated years (between the Reports 
and  1850 census data). More work needs to be done comparing the Reports 
with purely civilian sources, particularly for locations in the Midwest and the 
South. 
By comparison with other archival sources for the antebellum period, the 
spatial, temporal, and occupational coverage of  the Reports sample is quite 
good.9 It is not good enough, however, to produce finely disaggregated wage 
series for the entire 1821 to 1856 period, for example, by simple averaging of 
the original data. Instead, hedonic wage regressions were estimated, and the 
regression coefficients form the basis for annual dollar estimates of  nominal 
wages of common laborers/teamsters, and skilled artisans for the four census 
regions (Northeast, Midwest, South Atlantic, and South Central). Because the 
regressions reveal a good deal of information about the cross-sectional deter- 
minants of antebellum wages and because the methodology differs from that 
used in previous research on antebellum wages, the details are reported here 
in an appendix. 
To convert one of the nominal wage series into an index of real wages, one 
must deflate by an index of prices. Since the wage series are region-specific, 
so should the price indices be. The only available region-specific price data 
pertain to wholesale prices (see section 4.2.2).  Using these data, Goldin and 
Margo (1992) estimated region-specific price deflators.l0  For the purposes of 
deflating nominal wages, the new  price indices are superior to those previ- 
ously constructed from wholesale price data, because the new  indices are 
based on a set of commodities consumed by households (for example, flour, 
pork, coffee) and exclude commodities like iron bars and so forth that were 
9. The Reports are  not, however, comprehensive with respect to the  variety  of occupations 
found in the antebellum United States, for example, in the  1850 census. Thus the Reporrs cannot 
be used to reconstruct the antebellum wage structure in fine detail. 
10. The price indices are geometrically weighted aggregates of price indices of specific goods; 
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not consumed by households (but that were included in other wholesale price 
indices).  I 
The limitations of the new price indices are serious and should be kept in 
mind. No adjustment has been made for housing prices. It is assumed in the 
construction of the indices that wholesale price data for, say, New Orleans 
provides  a  usable price deflator for the  entire South Central region.  The 
wholesale price data do not give prices of finished textile products for all re- 
gions. It is therefore necessary to assume, for example, that long-term trends 
in retail prices of shoes were the same as long-term trends in wholesale leather 
prices.  This assumption is false, because it ignores productivity growth in 
finished textile production (Sokoloff 1986a). Fuel prices are proxied by  the 
wholesale price of coal even though wood was widely used in rural areas and 
wood and coal prices diverged in the long run (David and Solar 1977). Budget 
shares are assumed to be the same in every region, even though relative prices 
differed geographically. 
The real wage indices are graphed in figures 4.2-4.5  (the indices are re- 
ported in table 4A. 1). In general, real wage growth was less in the South than 
in the North. Real wages also grew more slowly in the Midwest than in the 
Northeast, but the opposite pattern occurred in comparing the South Atlantic 
and South Central regions. Real wage growth was more rapid in the  1840s 
than in the 1830s or early 1850s. 
Williamson and Lindert (1980; see also Kuznets 1955 and Lindert and Wil- 
liamson  1982) investigated whether income inequality in  the United States 
worsened between 1820 and 1860. Because there are no income statistics for 
the  period,  Williamson  and  Lindert used  skill  differentials-the  ratio of 
skilled to unskilled wages-as  a proxy for inequality, arguing that skill differ- 
entials increased in the late antebellum period (for a contrary view see Grosse 
1982). Data from the Reports, however, suggest that real wages of common 
laborers/teamsters  grew faster (or at about the same rate) as the real wages of 
artisans, and thus provide no evidence that a surge in skill differentials took 
place.  I2 
Table 4.1 gives estimates of  the long-run rate of  growth of  real wages. 
Three different methods are used to estimate the long-run growth rate: a re- 
gression of the (log) real wage on a linear trend, a straight-line interpolation 
between decadal averages (1851-56  compared with  1821-30),  and the mean 
of  the growth rates (the mean of the first difference of  the log wage). Using 
the regression method, the estimated growth rates range from a low of  0.4 
percent per annum (midwestem artisans) to a high of  1.6 percent (laborers in 
the Northeast). The regression method gives higher growth rates than either 
11. In this respect they are similar to the price deflators employed by Hansen (1925). Adam 
12. Goldin and Margo (1992) show that wages of  clerks increased more than wages of common 
(1968), and Williamson and Lindert (1980). 
laborers/tearnsters, providing some support for the surge hypothesis. 184  Robert A. Margo 
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Source: See text. 
the decadal averages or mean of the growth rates. This difference reflects the 
fact that real wages in every region fell in the early 1850s. Regional and oc- 
cupational differences, however,  are generally the  same regardless of  the 
method used to estimate the long-term trend. 
The new evidence confirms that real wages in the United States were higher 
in the 1850s than in the 1820s. Growth, however, was uneven geographically 185  Wages and Prices during the Antebellum Period 
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Source: See text. 
and differed across occupations. Further, real wages did not  increase in  a 
steady fashion from year to year. Rather, growth was highly erratic, some- 
times rising or falling very sharply in short periods of time (similar findings 
were reported by Adams 1982). I shall return to the erratic nature of real wage 
growth in section 4.6. 186  Robert A. Margo 
Table 4.1  Real Wage Growth during the Antebellum Period 
Common Laborers/ 
Artisans  Teamsters 
Coefficient on trend (In w = a + Pt) 
Northeast  0.0114  0.0155 
Midwest  0.0038  0.0142 
South Atlantic  0.0043  0.0059 
South Central  0.0140  0.0120 
Decadal averages (1821-30/1851-56) 
Northeast  0.0081  0.0121 
Midwest  0.0036  0.0107 
South Atlantic  0.0039  o.oO01 
South Central  0.01  12  0.0106 
Mean of growth rates 
Northeast  0.0156  0.01 13 
Midwest  0.0081  0.0027 
South Atlantic  0.0062  0.0077 
South Central  0.0082  0.0067 
Source: See text. 
Note:  Figures are average annual changes in the log of  real daily wage, 1821-56. 
4.4  Comparing Different Estimates of Real Wage Growth 
Because there are no alternative series for the antebellum South or Mid- 
west, it is difficult to assess the novelty of  the insights provided by  the real 
wage indices presented in the previous section. It is possible, however, to 
compare the new  index of  unskilled wages for the Northeast to previously 
constructed indices. 
The basic issues are as follows: the Margo-Villaflor (hereafter MV) index 
shows relatively little real wage growth in the 183Os, considerable growth in 
the 1840s, and a sharp decline in real wages in the early 1850s (see also Han- 
sen 1925). By comparison, the index of unskilled wages constructed by David 
and Solar (1977; hereafter DS) shows a steady rise from decade to decade. 
The unskilled index constructed by Williamson and Lindert (1980; hereafter 
WL) shows considerable growth in the 1830s and a decline in the early 1850s. 
These discrepancies lead to radically different pictures of  the antebellum 
economy. The 1820s and 1830s (before the Panic of 1837)  are frequently char- 
acterized as years of economic expansion, yet the MV index implies that un- 
skilled nonfarm workers gained little from that expansion. The decline in real 
wages in the early 1850s shown by the MV and WL indices (but not the DS 
index) has recently been given considerable weight in explanations of the po- 
litical realignment of the 1850s (Fogel 1990). 
Table 4.2 shows the differences in decadal averages between the three se- 
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lsble 4.2  Explaining Different Estimates of Real Wage Growth; Unskilled 
Labor, 1821-56 
Nominal wages 
Margo-Villaflor  David-Solar  Williamson-Lindert 
182  1-30  100.0  100.0  100.0 
183140  108.9  109.6  130.0 
1841-50  119.8  104.5  129.0 
1851-56  138.1  121.5  141.8 
Margo-Villaflor real wage index with different price deflators 
1821-30  100.0  100.0 
183140  122.4  103.7 
1841-50  153.9  152.8 
1851-56  171.0  140.5 
David-Solar  Goldin-Margo 
David-Solar real wage index with different price deflators 
David-Solar  Goldin-Margo 
1821-30  100.0  100.0 
183140  122.7  104.1 
1841-50  133.3  132.8 
185  1-56  150.6  123.9 
Williamson-Lindert  real wage index with different price deflators 
David-Solar  Goldin-Margo 
182  1-30  100.0  100.0 
183140  146.0  123.6 
184  1-50  164.8  163.0 
1851-56  175.4  143.9 
than either the DS index or especially the WL index. In the 1840s, the MV 
index shows another increase, while the DS and WL indices both show de- 
clines. Growth in nominal wages from 1841-50  to 1851-56  is about the same 
in the MV and DS indices but is smaller in the WL index. 
The remainder of the table shows the decadal average of real wages using 
either  the  DS  or Goldin  and  Margo (1992; hereafter GM) price deflator. 
Clearly the major difference between the MV and DS indices in the 1830s is a 
consequence of the price deflator. If the DS price deflator is used with the MV 
nominal wage index, real wages growth is just slightly less than that shown 
by  the DS  real wage index. However, the WL nominal wage index shows 
much greater real wage growth in the 1830s than either the DS or MV indices. 
Comparing the 1840s to the 1830s all of the indices show much less real 
wage growth using the DS price deflator than using the GM price deflator. The 
GM price deflator is also primarily responsible for the decline in real wages in 
the early 1850s; if the DS price deflator is used instead, all of the indices show 
growth. It is also clear that the GM price deflator gives a somewhat lower 188  Robert A. Margo 
long-run rate of growth (comparing the 1850s to the 1820s) than the DS price 
deflator. 
As a first step toward reconciling the differences across the real wage in- 
dices, I consider how the WL and DS indices of nominal wages were derived. 
For 182  1 to 1830 DS used data originally collected by the Massachusetts Bu- 
reau of  Labor Statistics. For 1831 to 1839 DS used geometrically weighted 
averages for Erie Canal and Abbott’s (1905) calculations of  average wages 
from the Weeks report. From 1840 to  1880 DS spliced into the Weeks data. 
For 1821 to 1834 the WL index consists of quotations from Adams’s (1939) 
Vermont data. For 1835 to 1839 WL spliced into Layer’s (1955) wage series 
for manufacturing  workers.  From  1840 to  1860 the WL index consists of 
observations on common labor drawn from the Aldrich report. 
It is likely that splicing accounts for the differences between the MV and 
the DS  and WL nominal wage estimates. Although DS purport to rely on 
wage observations from the Northeast for the pre-1840s part of  their index, 
the Weeks quotations for  1836 to  1838 actually pertain to St. Louis, which 
had much higher than average nominal wages (see the Midwest regressions in 
the Appendix). The WL index shows an abrupt increase in nominal wages in 
1835 (the point of the splice to Layer), an increase not present in the other 
indices. The DS and WL indices overstate nominal wage growth in the 1830s. 
This overstatement, in turn, causes both indices to show less real wage growth 
from the 1830s to the 1840s than does the MV index.I3 
Differences in nominal wages, however, do not fully account for differences 
in real wage growth. The choice of a price deflator is crucial. As pointed out 
earlier, to construct the pre-1850 portion of their price index, DS relied on 
Vermont data and Brady’s (1966) retail price quotations at benchmark dates. 
After 1850 DS spliced into Hoover’s (1960) index, which was based on retail 
price quotations from the Weeks report. 
Part of the difference between the DS and GM price deflators could be ex- 
plained if wholesale prices were more variable in the short- and medium-run 
than retail prices.  DS purport to show such a difference by  graphing their 
index against the Warren and Pearson wholesale price index, and by estimat- 
ing a regression of  their index on an index of  Philadelphia wholesale prices. 
These  comparisons  are  questionable because the  DS  price  index and  the 
wholesale price indices are not based on a common set of goods (this is partic- 
ularly true for the nonbenchmark years, since the Vermont data do not include 
price quotations for many of the goods regularly traded in wholesale markets). 
The correlation between short-run movements in wholesale and retail prices 
is discussed further in section 4.6. Here I simply wish to note again the neces- 
13. The level of the WL real wage index in the 1840s (using the GM deflator) is higher than the 
MV real  wage  index level. This difference is primarily due to WL’s use of  Vermont nominal 
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sity of more and better retail price data in order to properly measure the rela- 
tionship between retail and wholesale fluctuations. 
This point aside, the basic reason the DS price deflator shows much larger 
real wage increases in the  1830s can be traced to two aspects of  the index. 
First, the DS price index shows a much greater decline in prices from 1821- 
23 to 1831-33  than does the GM index. This is a consequence of  the use of 
the Adams series as an interpolator, which shows an extremely steep rate of 
decline, much steeper than the decline in wholesale prices over the same pe- 
riod. Although DS corrected the Adams interpolator for its excessive down- 
ward trend relative to Brady’s benchmark dates, they had no benchmark date 
for the early 1820s. That the Adams interpolator gives too steep a rate of price 
decline is confirmed by DS’s regression of their index on Philadelphia whole- 
sale prices. The predicted DS index from the regression shows a smaller de- 
cline in prices between 1821-23  and 1831-33  than the actual DS index. Until 
more evidence on retail prices from the early 1820s is found, it seems prudent 
not to rely on the DS price index for those years. 
Second, the DS price index shows a smaller increase in prices from 1834 to 
1839 (especially  1834 to  1836) than does the GM price index. Comparing 
1834 to 1836, the GM index increases from 84.6 to 110.2, but the increase in 
the DS index is much less, 103 to 112. Some of this difference can be traced 
to Brady’s data and to DS’s expenditure weights. Brady’s data show sharp 
declines in prices of coffee and tea (two consumption staples) between 1834 
and 1836, declines not present in wholesale price data. Brady’s data also show 
extraordinary short-run declines in the prices of several clothing items, such 
as hosiery, buttons, and cotton thread. In constructing their price index, DS 
gave a lower weight to food (39.5 percent) than is customary in nineteenth- 
century price indices. This tends to dampen price increases in the mid-1830s 
because Brady’s data show larger increases in food prices between 1834 and 
1839 than  do her  nonfood  prices.I4 If  one  uses  Brady’s data,  substitutes 
wholesale prices for coffee and tea,  and  excludes clothing items with  ex- 
tremely steep price declines, the revised DS index shows an increase in prices 
between 1834 and  1836 of  about 18 percent. This is still a smaller increase 
than shown by the GM index; the remaining difference may be due to short- 
run differences in wholesale and retail price changes. 
The next issue concerns the decline in real wages in the early 1850s. As is 
clear from table 4.2, this difference, too, is a consequence of the choice of a 
price deflator. The basic reason the DS price index results in an increase in 
real wages while the GM deflator results in a decrease turns on the behavior 
of the subindices making up the Hoover (1960) price index. First, the Hoover 
food price subindex shows a much smaller increase in food prices from 185  1 
to  1856 than does the GM price index and virtually no change in clothing 
14. For example, Hoover’s (1960) budget share for food was 59 percent. 190  Robert A. Margo 
prices over the same period, despite a 39 percent rise in the wholesale price of 
cotton and a 70 percent rise in the wholesale price of leather in the Northeast. 
Second, the Hoover index includes a rent component, which displays very 
little increase in housing prices between 1851 and 1856. Yet  there is consid- 
erable anecdotal evidence of rising housing prices, particularly in northeast- 
ern cities in the early  1850s, due to massive immigration. The problem, as 
Lebergott (1964) observed some time ago (see also Fogel, Galantine, and 
Manning 1992), is that much of the Weeks data pertained to company stores 
and company-owned housing in small towns. Price movements in the Weeks 
data may be artificially dampened because of  the nature of the sample; thus 
use of the Weeks price data leads to too rosy a picture for real wages in the 
early 1850s. 
Thus far I have argued that the discrepancies between the various indices 
arise primarily because of biases in the DS an WL nominal wage indices and 
in the DS price index. Yet  not all of the problems rest with the DS and WL 
indices. Because the MV index was derived from an hedonic regression that 
did not fit the data perfectly, some of the year-to-year variability in real wages 
is noise. The number of observations underlying certain estimates is small- 
sometimes smaller than the number available in the Aldrich or Weeks reports 
for particular years (this is especially true in the late 1840s and early 1850s). 
Even with these problems, the advantages of the new indices are considerable. 
They are not spliced from disparate data sources, and they control for chang- 
ing sample composition from year to year. 
The MV indices suggest that real wage growth may have been less than 
previously thought in the 1830s and that real wages fell in the early 1850s. It 
is important to stress that these conclusions rest on the choice of a price defla- 
tor. Although a case has been made here against the DS price deflator, the GM 
price deflator is far from perfect. It lacks a housing price component, and one 
is forced to assume that yearly changes in wholesale prices mimicked yearly 
changes in retail prices. Further work is necessary to determine if the conclu- 
sions implied by the new indices are sustained with better price deflators. 
4.5  Regional Differences: The Northeast and the Midwest 
The indices presented in section 4.3 do not show how real wage levels dif- 
fered between regions. Here I estimate the ratio of real wages in the Midwest 
relative to the Northeast. Real wages were generally higher in the Midwest, 
and there was a slight but erratic downward trend in the MidwesUNortheast 
ratio of real wages. This downward trend is consistent with the direction of 
internal migration in the North and also suggests the (modest) beginnings of 
regional labor market integration. That real wages were higher in the Midwest 
implies that population redistribution raised the northern growth rate above 
the rate experienced in the Northeast or the Midwest. 
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it is necessary to construct an index of relative regional prices. This index, 
like the ones constructed by Goldin and Margo (1992), is based on wholesale 
price data. 
Basic findings are shown in figures 4.6 (artisans) and 4.7 (common labor- 
erdteamsters). Among artisans, real wages were almost always higher in the 
Midwest than in the Northeast. The wage gap increased in the late 1820s but 
then declined in the early 183Os, consistent with the sharp increase in immi- 
gration into the Midwest during that period. The gap also declined in the early 
1840s. The Midwest was hit harder by the depression of the early 1840s than 
the Northeast was (North 1966). The gap then increased in the late 1840s as 
recovery occurred. The decline in the gap in the early 1850s was a conse- 
quence of rising in-migration plus the temporary glutting of  midwestern labor 
markets due to the ending of the railroad-building boom (Fogel 1989). 
The results for common laborerdteamsters indicate greater regional simi- 
larity, but this conclusion is heavily influenced by the inclusion of Pittsburgh 
in the Midwest. Unskilled wages were much lower in Pittsburgh than at other 
forts in the Midwest (see the Appendix). If  Pittsburgh were included in the 
Northeast, the real wage gap would have been substantial. 
The notes to the figures show regressions of the regional real wage ratio on 
a time trend. The negative coefficient on the time trend for artisans suggest the 
beginnings of regional labor market integration. Rosenbloom ( 1990) recently 
investigated labor market integration in the North in the late nineteenth cen- 
tury. If one uses the regression in figure 4.5 to predict the regional wage gap 
in the mid-l870s,  the gap is predicted to be about 7 percent, which is quite 
close to Rosenbloom’s estimate of the regional gap (8.5  percent for building 
tradesmen). Thus, while integration of regional labor markets for skilled arti- 
sans began in the antebellum period, the pace at which integration took place 
was rather slow.  For common laborers/teamsters, there is little evidence of 
regional integration at all. 
The principal implication of these results concerns the difference between 
aggregate  (northern) rates  of  growth of  real  wages  and  regional rates  of 
growth. Because real wages were higher in the Midwest than in the Northeast, 
the shift of population from the Midwest to the Northeast raised the overall 
growth rate of real wages in the North.I5 The result confirms other research 
showing that per capita income growth in the North was accomplished with 
the aid of interregional migration (Fogel 1989) and that the existence of  sec- 
toral shifts in the context of wage gaps contributed to antebellum growth (Da- 
vid 1967; Adam 1982). 
15. Because regional differences were much smaller by  the  early twentieth century (Rosen- 
bloom 1990), improved labor market integration contributed to economic growth in  the North 
over the nineteenth century. Calculating the size of this contribution would be difficult, however, 
because it would be necessary to determine how much of the regional wage gap was a disequilib- 
rium rather than a compensating differential for mobility costs. 192  Robert A. Margo 
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4.6  The Short-Run Behavior of Wages and Prices 
It is clear from the evidence presented earlier that the growth rate of  real 
wages fluctuated a great deal in the short and medium run. Antebellum growth 
in real wages was not a continuous affair. Rather, growth was uneven from 
year to year, punctuated by  periods of  sharp increases and equally sharp de- 
clines. 
These fluctuations were not randomly timed over the antebellum period. 
The fluctuations were correlated with short-run movements in prices and with 
real  shocks.  Nominal  wages  did  not  adjust instantaneously-when  prices 
rose, as in the mid-l830s, real wages fell; when prices fell in the early 1840s, 
real wages rose.  l6 Declining real wages in the early 1850s appear to have been 
a combination of nominal wages lagging behind rising prices and downward 
pressure on nominal wages caused by a sudden wave of immigration and other 
real shocks (Fogel 1989). 
The short-run behavior of wages and prices may have important implica- 
tions for understanding the antebellum macroeconomy. Even if, in the long 
run, real wages followed an equilibrium growth path determined by real fac- 
tors (productivity growth and the growth of factor supplies), real wages in the 
short run could have been persistently below or above their long-run level. If 
they  were,  it  is possible that  fluctuations in employment could have been 
large. Although some economic historians have argued against such a view of 
antebellum business cycles (Temin 1969), others have attached great impor- 
tance to short-run fluctuations (Fogel 1989, 1990). 
In a recent paper, Goldin and Margo (1992) examined the time-series prop- 
erties of the MV real wage series. The basic issue was whether real wages 
followed a long-run growth path dictated by long-run movements in real fac- 
tors, which were captured by  a linear time trend or by a proxy for per capita 
GNP.”  No evidence was found against the view that real wages did follow 
such a path. But Goldin and Margo also found that short-run deviations from 
the long-run path were quite persistent-for  example, up to five years were 
needed to restore equilibrium after a price (or other) shock.I8  Deviations were 
16. The stability of nominal wages in the face of wide fluctuations in commodity prices is a 
very old (and apparently universal) problem in economic history; see, for example, the various 
papers in Scholliers (1989). 
17. Posed somewhat differently, this question was also investigated by David and Solar (1977, 
37-39),  Sokoloff (1986b), and Rothenberg (1988). Using very different methods, similar results 
were obtained for a number of nineteenth-century European economies by Bairoch (1989). 
18. Williamson (in his comment to this paper) speculates that the result may be an artifact of 
the use of hedonic regressions to construct the nominal wage indices. But a regression is merely a 
particular way of obtaining  an average.  Hence, if  nominal wages are stable from year to year 
while prices fluctuate and the fit of the regression is less than perfect (which was the case), it 
follows that some wage changes at the individual level were opposite in sign to contemporaneous 
price changes. Disaggregating to the individual level will not answer the question why shocks 
were persistent on average, which is the question posed by Goldin and Margo (1992). The per- 
sistence of shocks is largely the consequence of  a few episodes in which large nominal or real 
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more persistent in the Northeast than in the North Central region, and  for 
skilled labor than for unskilled labor. Goldin and Margo also found that devia- 
tions were largely transitory for agricultural labor, which suggests that the 
large farm sector may have served as an important buffer against urban un- 
employment during economic downturns (Temin 1969; Keyssar 1986). 
Persistence of  shocks to real wages may  not  seem very surprising, given 
similar findings for the post-1860 period (DeCanio and Mokyr 1977; James 
1989; Hanes 1990). But it leaves open the question as to why, in an economy 
previously characterized as satisfying textbook properties of flexibility (Temin 
1969), persistent effects of shocks should be present at all. 
One possibility is imperfect information (Lucas 198  1). Antebellum firms 
may have confused absolute price changes-inflation  or deflation-with  rel- 
ative price changes. Thinking that absolute change was specific to their indus- 
try, firms may have been led to adjust real quantities (labor) rather than nomi- 
nal  quantities (wages).  Although  the  Northeast  had  the  most  developed 
markets of  the period, the difficulty of  distinguishing relative and absolute 
price changes may have been greater in regions, such as the Northeast, with 
more heterogeneous goods than in simpler economies such as the Midwest. 
With modem data, a standard way of testing for such an effect is to examine 
the relationship between average price changes (inflation or deflation) and 
changes in relative price dispersion (the variance of relative prices). If average 
price changes were neutral, they should bear no systematic relationship with 
the variance of relative prices. Recent research tends to reject this conclusion, 
generally finding a significant positive relationship between the variance of 
price changes and the mean price change (see the references cited in Quddus, 
Liu, and Butler 1988). 
Using wholesale price data for New  York City, relative price dispersion is 
defined to be the variance of  the first difference of  the logarithm of  annual 
price changes for ten commodities. The overall rate of  price change is the 
square of the unweighted average of the individual price changes, or the rate 
of change of the Warren-Pearson price index. 
A positive correlation between average price change and relative price dis- 
persion is revealed by  simple regressions of  the variance of  price changes 
(VR) on the squared mean price change (unweighted average, UA, or Warren- 
Pearson, WP): 
VR  =  0.004 +  0.679UA 
(4.459)  (7.336)  R2  = .47 
VR  =  0.005 +  0.287WP 
(4.851)  (3.507)  R2 = .16 
A positive correlation, however, is not the same as causation. Causation 
can be investigated using a Granger causality test. If the theory were correct, 
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relative price dispersion. However, the results are exactly the opposite-caus- 
ality runs from relative price dispersion to average price changes.  l9 
Although the causality result may appear puzzling, it is consistent with ac- 
counts of antebellum business cycles, particularly the Panic of  1837. During 
the 1830s the United States was on a specie standard together with free bank- 
ing. In the early 1830s favorable harvests in Great Britain and rising British 
prices led to capital exports to the United States and a trade deficit. To restore 
equilibrium, American prices-particularly  cotton prices-had  to rise. For 
prices to rise the money supply had to increase, and most of the increase (in 
the mid-1830s) resulted from an inflow of specie. The increase in the money 
supply, in turn, caused wholesale prices to rise, with a slight lag. Thus the 
causality ran from a real shock in Great Britain-good  harvests-to  relative 
price dispersion in the United States, an increase in the money supply, and 
ultimately to a higher American price level (Temin 1969). 
The causality test does not rule out an imperfect information explanation of 
persistence, but it does suggest that other factors were involved. One possibil- 
ity involves the time-series properties of  the antebellum price level. Recent 
work suggests the antebellum price level can be approximated by  an inte- 
grated time series (Goldin and Margo 1992). An integrated time series is non- 
stationary-it  does not return to a fixed mean, unlike a stationary series. An 
example of an integrated time series is a random walk. Were the price level a 
true random walk, price changes-inflation  or deflation-would  be white 
noise-a  mean-zero, serially uncorrelated time series. In thinking about this 
possibility, keep in mind that it is extremely difficult to distinguish an inte- 
grated series from a near-integrated series (which is still stationary), yet this 
distinction may have been crucial to behavior. Also, standard tests can reject 
stationarity even if the series is stationary over subperiods but the mean shifts 
from one subperiod to the next (see below). 
It is easy to see how random walk-like  movements in prices could lead to 
wild ex post fluctuations in real wages in the short run. Consider a worker 
hired for, say, a six-month period. During the period of the contract the worker 
may consume all sorts of goods whose prices fluctuate unpredictably in the 
short run. Even if it were costless to continuously renegotiate labor contracts, 
price fluctuations might be tolerated by the worker because (if average price 
changes were truly white noise) the real wage will be constant, on average, 
over the period of the contract. Ex post, the real wage fluctuates a great deal 
within the period. If it is difficult to determine if a particular sequence of price 
changes is serially correlated (is persistent) and if  it is costly to renegotiate 
labor contracts, one might observe persistent deviations in real wages from 
19. Tests of Granger causality from mean price  changes to relative price dispersion yielded 
F-statistics of 0.24 (UA) and 0.56 (WP). Tests of Grander causality from relative price dispersion 
to mean price changes yielded F-statistics of 5.01 (UA) and 2.82 (WP). The latter two statistics 
are significant at the 5 percent level. The lag length for the tests was set at 3 (three years). 1%  Robert A. Margo 
long-run equilibrium values. Only when inflation or deflation became abun- 
dantly clear would nominal wages adjust, possibly abruptly. 
This analysis may be relevant for the antebellum period. Although labor 
contracts were generally quite brief during the period, in the sense that work- 
ers might be hired by the day or the month, it does not follow that all param- 
eters of such contracts, such as the nominal wage, would be renegotiated con- 
tinuously. This is especially true if, as was  the case during the antebellum 
period, the price level might be close to stationary (or stationary around a 
downward trend) for several years, only to suddenly shift upward or down- 
ward. During the inflation of the mid-l830s, strikes by journeyman cabinet- 
makers in New York are said to have been motivated by the fact that “the price 
book  [giving journeymen’s wages] used by  their masters was more than a 
quarter of a century old. . . . the old book failed to keep up with the cost of 
living” (Wilentz 1984, 231). It was these sudden shifts, due to international 
events (the 1830s) or gold discoveries (1850s), that led first to confusion, then 
to a revision of  price expectations, and ultimately to nominal wage adjust- 
ments. 
Nor is the point relevant for just the antebellum period. After the Civil War 
(1870 to 1897) deflation became a fact of economic life. Then in  1898, gold 
discoveries led to rapid price increases. Expectations did not adjust immedi- 
ately, and real wages fell. The adjustment lag was not necessarily irrational. 
Barsky and De Long (1988) have recently shown that sophisticated economic 
agents, given the information available at the time, might have  concluded 
there was no necessary positive relationship between changes in specie pro- 
duction and changes in the price level.20  Ex post they were wrong, but not 
necessarily ex ante. 
4.7  Summary 
This paper has surveyed recent work on prices and wages before the Civil 
War.  Although there are serious shortcomings in the available data, the evi- 
dence suggests that, with notable exceptions, long-run growth in real wages 
was substantial before the Civil War.  Because real wages were higher in the 
Midwest than in the Northeast, population redistribution raised the average 
rate of growth of real wages in the North. 
But the research also suggests that real wage growth was erratic in the short 
run, and that shocks to real wages had persistent effects. Historians have em- 
phasized the importance of these fluctuations to the social, labor, and political 
history of the period, and rightly so. But a comprehensive explanation of the 
persistence of shocks to real wages during the antebellum period remains to 
be developed. 
20. As Barsky  and De  Long  (1988) demonstrate, it is this adjustment lag that  causes late- 
nineteenth-century interest rates to violate the “Fisher” equation, namely, that the real interest rate 
equals the nominal rate plus the expected rate of change in the price level. 197  Wages and Prices during the Antebellum Period 
Appendix 
Nominal Wage Estimates 
This appendix describes the nominal wage estimates used in the construction 
of the real wage indices (see table 4A. l).21  The hedonic wage regressions are 
reported in tables 4A.2-4A.5. 
Weighting Procedure 
The idea is to attach to each fort location a decade-specific share of  the 
region’s population and to each occupation (within the skilled and unskilled 
groups) an occupational share. The weight for the variables MONTHLY, HIGH, 
LOW,  and SLAVE (South Atlantic and South Central) is zero; for SPRING,  SUM- 
MER,  and  FALL the weight is 0.25.22  The wage estimates refer to ordinary 
skilled or unskilled workers, hired on a daily basis, averaged over the year to 
account for seasonal variations. The fort location and occupation weights are 
shown in table 4A.6. 
The fort weights were derived from population figures in U.S.  Bureau of 
the Census (1975, ser. A 195-209)  and are decade-by-decade averages. For 
example, the fort weight for southern New England for the 1820s (0.244) is 
the average of  the share of the northeastern population living in Massachu- 
setts, New  Hampshire, Connecticut, and Rhode Island in  1820 and  1830. 
Similarly, the  1830s weight is an average of the 1830 and  1840 population 
shares; the 1850 weight, the 1850 and 1860 population 
The occupational weights are derived from the 1850 census. For example, 
the weight for teamsters (0.04) reflects the fact that, of  all persons in  the 
Northeast reporting an occupation of teamster or common laborer in  1850, 4 
percent were teamsters. 
The principal advantage of the weighting procedure is that it adjusts for the 
geographic and regional differences between the sample and the antebellum 
population. The procedure is crude: it assumes that the labor market to which 
the fort belonged was  proportional in  size to the population of  the area in 
which the fort was situated, and no adjustments are made for changes in the 
occupational distribution over time.  A key  advantage of  the  hedonic ap- 
proach, however, is that other economic historians are free to use whatever 
weights they wish to generate a different set of estimates from the regressions 
21. The estimates  themselves are reported in Margo and Villaflor (1987, 893-94). 
22. Rations were valued at 12 cents each; see  Margo and Villaflor (1987,878).  The only excep 
tion was the South Central common laboredteamster  regression, in which the number of rations 
was included as an independent variable. In constructing the South Central wage estimates, the 
rations weight was set equal to its sample mean, 0.055. 
23. The notes to the fort location tables give the geographic areas identified with each coeffi- 
cient in the construction of the fort location weights. For example, in the Northeast table, the 
coefficient for Carlisle, Pennsylvania, is identified with “rural Pennsylvania”;  this means the Car: 
lisle coefficient was weighted by the share of  the northeastern population living in rural Pennsyl- 
vania. 198  Robert A. Margo 
Table 4A.1  Real Wage Indices 
Artisans  Common Laborersmeamsters 
New  South  South  New  South  South 






























































































































































































































































































































Source: See text. 
Notes: The artisan indices are relative to a region-specific base of  100 for common laborers/teamsters in 
1856. For example, the  1854 index number for northeastern artisans (143.2)  means that real wages of 
artisans in  1854 were 43.2 percent higher than the real wage of common laborers/teamsters in 1856. 199  Wages and Prices during the Antebellum Period 
Table 4A.2  Regressions of Nominal Daily Wage Rate, Northeast 
Variable 
Artisan  Common LaborerfTeamster 
P  r-statistic  P  r-statistic 
Constant 
Fort location 
Upstate New  York 
Philadelphia 
Cadisle, Pennsylvania 
Southern New England 
Northern New England 



























































-  0.432 
-  0.297 
-  0.373 
-  0.420 
-  0.463 
-0.409 
-  0.372 



























-  3.627 
-4.665 
-4.084 
-  4.063 
-5.216 
-3.714 







-  5.396 
-  9.442 
-  7.456 
-  6.847 
-5.089 
-  6.632 














-  0.046 
0.104 
-0.410 
-  0.445 
-  0.445 
-  0.449 
-0.281 
-0.335 
-  0.442 
-0.499 
-  0.493 
-  0.507 
-  0.458 
-  0.47 1 
-0.292 











-  2.040 
2.650 
0.214 








-  3.527 
-3.587 










-  3.078 
-3.078 
-  3.093 
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Table 4A.2  (continued) 
Variable  Artisan  Common Laborer/Teamster 























-  0.106 
3,555 
0.61 
-  4.202 
-  5.985 
-4.102 
-  6.605 
-  5.947 
-6.162 
-3.182 













-  2.426 
-2.016 
-  1.539 
-  1.276 
-1.111 
-0.782 
Notes:  Artisan:  constant term represents an ordinary carpenter, hired on a daily basis withoul 
rations in the winter at a fort in or nearby New York  City in  1856. Common laborer/tearnsrec 
constant term represents a common laborer hired on a daily basis without rations at a fort in of 
near New York City in 1856. 
Table 4A.3  Regressions of Nominal Daily Wage Rate, Midwest 
Variable 
Artisan  Common Laborer/Teamster 






Michigan (other than Detroit) 
Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota 
Ft. Leavenworth 

































-  2.967 
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Table 4A.3  (continued) 
Variable  Artisan  Common LaboredTeamster 




















































































-  1.534 




-  15.105 
-14.113 
-9.215 
-  15.708 
-9.561 
-8.809 
-  8.768 
-2.818 
-  2.694 
-2.524 
-  1.850 






-  0.427 


























-  1.812 
-  1.382 
-3.999 
-4.974 
-  6.885 
-  6.879 
-7.245 
-  5.133 
-  4.783 
-  2.886 
-4.903 
-4.911 
-  1.822 
-  1.276 
-3.851 
6.442 
-  1.889 
3.467 
-4.493 





-  2.155 





Notes: Artisan: constant term represents an ordinary carpenter, hired on  a daily basis without 
rations during the winter at a fort at or near St. Louis in  1856. Common luborerlteumster:  con- 
stant term represents a common laborer hired on a daily basis without rations at a fort at or near 
St. Louis in  1856. 202  Robert A. Margo 
Table 4A.4  Regressions of Nominal Daily Wage Rate, South Atlantic States 
Variable 
Artisan  Common Laborermeamster 
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-  1.645 
-2.118 
-0.377 
-  0.090 
-  1.051 
-0.599 
-0.323 






-  1.604 
-  1.369 
-1.114 
-1.204 









-  0.108 
0.050 
-  0.028 



























-  1.492 
-4.517 
0.928 
-  0.590 
-  1.908 
5.747 





-  4.600 
-3.871 
-  1.728 
-  1.341 
-  3.015 





-  2.345 
-  2.628 
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Table 4A.4  (continued) 
Variable  Artisan  Common Laborer/Teamster 
P  t-statistic  P  t-statistic 
185 1-53  -0.352  -2.507 
1852-55  0.161  1.41  1 
1854-55  -0.112  -0.490 
N  1,906  2,071 
RZ  0.60  0.54 
Nores: Artisan: constant term represents  an ordinary carpenter, hired on a daily basis without 
rations during the winter at Fort Monroe, Virginia in 1856. Common laborerheamsrer: constant 
term represents a common laborer hired on a daily basis without rations during the winter at Fort 
Monroe, Virginia, in 1856. Slave = 1 if the person was a slave, 0 otherwise. 
Table 4A.5  Regressions of Nominal Daily Wage Rate, South Central States 
Variable 
Artisan  Common LaboredTeamster 
P  r-statistic  P  r-statistic 
Constant 
Fort location 




















Worker or job characteristics 
Season 
Year 


































-  20.674 
-4.784 
-5.119 






-  1.914 
-  1.435 




-  0.445 








-  0.073 











-  10.846 
-0.564 
-  10.639 
10.890 
-  17.129 





-  0.982 
2.502 
-7.716 
-  6.334 
-7.236 
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Table 4A.5  (continued) 
Variable  Artisan  Common LaborerReamster 















































-  0.167 
-0.036 
-0.128 








-  1.096 
-0.641 








-  1.634 
-  2.177 
-2.512 
-0.564 












-  0.079 
-  0.176 
-0.002 
0.022 
-  0.163 
-  0.044 
-0.096 















-  1.202 
-0.304 
-  1.288 
-  1.360 
-  1.748 




-  10.847 
-  2.202 
-  1.288 
0.488 
-0.461 
-  1.257 
-0.875 









Notes: Artisan: constant term represents  an ordinary carpenter, hired on a daily basis without 
rations in the winter in New Orleans in 1856. Common  laborer/teamster: constant term represents 
a common laborer hired on a daily basis without rations during the winter in New Orleans in 
1856. Slave = 1 if the person was a slave, 0 otherwise. 205  Wages and Prices during the Antebellum Period 
Table 4A.6  Weights for Nominal Wage Estimates 
Panel A: Fort Location Weights 
1820s  1830s  1840s  18505 
Northeast 
Upstate New York 
Philadelphia 
Carlisle, Pennsylvania 
Southern New England 




Michigan (other than Detroit) 
Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota 






























































































South  South 
Northeast  Midwest  Atlantic  Central 
Mason  0.21  0.19  0.18  0.17 
Blacksmith  0.16  0.04  0.08  0.03 
Painter-plasterer  0.10  0.06  0.08  0.03 
Teamster  0.04  0.03  0.02  0.02 
Source: See text. 
Nores:  Identification of fort location coefficients with population shares: upstate New York  = 
rural New York; Philadelphia  = urban Pennsylvania (eastern) and New Jersey; Carlisle = rural 
Pennsylvania;  southern  New  England  =  Massachusetts,  New  Hampshire,  and  Connecticut; 
northern New England  = Maine and Vermont; Pittsburgh  = western Pennsylvania and rural 
Ohio; Cincinnati  = urban Ohio and Indiana; Detroit  = urban Michigan; Baltimore  = urban 
Maryland  and District  of Columbia;  Savannah  = urban Georgia;  Baton Rouge  = Louisiana 
except New Orleans; North Carolina, South Carolina, Arkansas, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ala- 
bama and Mississippi = state population shares. 206  Robert A. Margo 
(for example, estimate wage series for each fort and then produce regional 
series by taking unweighted averages of the fort-specific  estimates)  .24 
Step-by-step Calculation of Estimates 
To  derive the wage estimates, multiply the fort coefficients by the decade- 
specific  fort  weights,  the  occupational  coefficients  by  the  occupational 
weights, and the seasonal coefficients by the seasonal weight (0.25), and add 
together. Take the sum and add the constant term to it: call the result a.  To  a 
add the coefficient of the time-period dummy, and exponentiate the result. 
As a specific example, the wage estimate for unskilled labor in the North- 
east in 1822 is $0.78. Multiplying the coefficients of the fort dummies by the 
fort weights for the 1820s (-0.068  X  0.291 + 0.079  X  0.043 + 0.008  x 
0.260 - 0.017  x 0.244 + 0.353  X  0.118), the teamster coefficient by the 
teamster weight (0.104 X  0.04), and the seasonal coefficients by the seasonal 
weight (-0.125  X  0.25 - 0.015  X  0.25 - 0.046  X  0.25)  and adding 
together with the constant term gives a=0.200. Adding to a  the coefficient 
of  the 1822 time dummy (- 0.445) and exponentiating gives the estimated 
wage of $0.78 ( =  exp [ -  0.245])? 
This procedure must be modified when the time-period dummy refers to a 
group of years rather than a single year. If the group refers to two years (for 
example, 1824-25), the estimated wage is assumed to refer to the second year 
(1825),  and the estimate for the first year is a linear interpolation of the pre- 
ceding year’s estimate (1  823) and the second year’s estimate (1  825). If  the 
group refers to three or more years (1824-26),  the estimated wage is assumed 
to refer to the midpoint of the group of years (1825.5), and the estimates for 
surrounding years are again calculated by  linear interpolation. All estimates 
for 1849 are interpolated because no reports have been found for that year. 
Northeast: Adjustment of  1835-37 Estimates 
Based on an extensive analysis of the original data and other evidence, the 
Northeast coefficients of the time dummies for 1835-37  for skilled labor and 
for 1836 for unskilled labor were deemed to be unreliable. To estimate wage 
changes from 1835 to 1837, data pertaining to workers at the Boston Naval 
Yard  was  used  (“Naval Hospital  Payrolls,” Bureau  of  Yards  and  Docks, 
Record Group 71, National Archives). It is important to note that these work- 
ers were building hospitals and other buildings at the yard, not ships (ship 
carpenters earned a premium above ordinary carpenters). Average wage rates 
24. Or no weights at all: because the dependent variable is the log of the daily wage, the coeffi- 
cients of the time dummies can be used directly to construct nominal wage indices (relative to a 
value of  1.0 for the base year,  1856). For example, the index number for artisans in the South 
Atlanticstatesin 1823is0.826(= exp[-0.191]). 
25. This procedure ignores the fact that, while the prediction error, e, of the regression has a 
mean value of zero (E[b] = 0), E(exp [PI)  is nonzero. The appropriate adjustment was too small 
to affect the results, however, and was ignored throughout. 207  Wages and Prices during the Antebellum Period 
for skilled artisans (carpenters, masons, painters, and plasterers) and common 
laborers were calculated for each year at the yard, and the resulting percentage 
changes in  wages  were used  to generate  new estimates  of  the  coefficients 
of the time dummies. The coefficient estimates  are for skilled laborers for 
1835-37  -0.236,  -0.167,  and -0.218  and for unskilled laborers for 1836 
-0.206. 
South Central: Adjustment of Fort Location Coefficients, Unskilled 
Regression 
Based on extensive comparisons with the original data, it appears that the 
unskilled  regression  significantly  overpredicts  wages  at forts  in  Kentucky, 
Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi.  New coefficients for these forts were 
derived directly from the data, by forming the ratio of wages at the forts to 
wages at New Orleans for specific years. The new coefficients are Kentucky, 
-  0.484, Tennessee, -  0.484, and Alabama-Mississippi, -  0.471. 
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Comment  Jeffrey G. Williamson 
Some Preliminaries 
We  all seem to agree that real wages of common labor were higher in Amer- 
ica than in Britain in the 1820s. Indeed, that’s why English emigrants came to 
North America, and that’s why visitors to colonial Philadelphia called Amer- 
ica the “best poor man’s country in the world” (Nash 1976, 545). Although 
the data are nowhere near as good for 1825 or 1855 as they are for 1895, 
especially for adjustments to purchasing-power parity and real wage compar- 
isons, we do have some strong priors. H. J. Habakkuk (1962, 11) thought that 
real wages of  American common labor might have  been 50 percent higher 
than those of the British early in the nineteenth century. John James and Jona- 
than Skinner (1985, table 5 ,  529) imply that real wages of common labor were 
at least 58 percent higher late in the antebellum period. My own estimates, 
summarized in table 4C. 1 , constructed using Margo’s antebellum estimates 
for the United States, suggest that those Anglo-American wage gaps were 
even higher than Habakkuk thought. If  Margo’s estimates are correct, they 
suggest that America’s superior position was strongly reinforced during the 
antebellum surge, American real wages rising to about 97 percent above the 
British in the mid-1850s. 
Some part of that American real wage superiority was lost in the half cen- 
tury that followed, falling to 44 percent above the British in  1895 and 54 
percent above the British in 1900. When and why did real wages of American 
common labor lose some of their striking superiority over Britain across the 
late nineteenth century? Part of the erosion took place during the Civil War 
decade, when real  wages slumped in  America (Williamson 1974, table 7, 
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Table 4C.1  Anglo-American Real Wage Gaps for Unskilled Labor, 1830-1913 









































































































































































Source:  Williamson (1992,  tables A2.1,  A2.2).  The data base uses purchasing-power-parity de- 
flators and daily wage rates for unskilled in the building trades to establish a truly comparable 
real wage benchmark around the turn of the century. The real wages are then projected backward 
to 1830,  using nominal wage series and cost-of-living deflators. Margo’s data in chapter 4  of this 
volume underlies the antebellum estimates for America. 
660), falling by  25-30  percent up to  1864, and recovering their 1860 levels 
only by  about 1869. America lost a decade of  real wage growth during the 
186Os, while British real wages rose by  22 percent (Williamson 1985, table 
2.13,30). America regained much of what it had lost by the early 1870s, only 
to lose a good share of it again in the following quarter century. By the 1890s, 
American wages were 40 or 50 percent higher than those in Britain. 
These calculations imply that American real wage growth surged ahead of 
Britain in the antebellum period, confirming Robert Margo’s assertion that 
American real wage growth was “substantial.” If we have the facts right, why 
the rise in the Anglo-American wage gap during the antebellum decades and 
the fall thereafter? Tim Hatton and I have been exploring this question for the 
Anglo-American gap, as well as for other pairs of countries representing the 212  Robert A. Margo 
Old and New World, as an integrated global labor market gradually emerged 
during the nineteenth century. The forces that contributed to the integration of 
trans-Atlantic labor markets certainly included the rising international migra- 
tions, which served to strengthen the links between national labor markets. 
They also must have included the evolution of  better-integrated commodity 
markets  (a  substitute  for  migration  via  factor-price  equalization effects: 
O’Rourke and Williamson 1992). Some might argue that it also would include 
technological diffusion along the lines of Gerschenkron and Baumol, Black- 
man, and Wolff  (1989), as well as better-integrated capital markets (another 
substitute for migration). However, these two arguments are unlikely to ac- 
count for the eroding Anglo-American gap after the mid 1850s, since Ameri- 
can GNP per  capita,  driven by  accumulation and  technical progress,  was 
catching up with and surging ahead of Britain, not falling behind. These two 
arguments may be stronger, of  course, in accounting for other international 
wage gaps: for example, between western Europe, on the one hand, and Scan- 
dinavia, the Mediterranean, and eastern Europe, on the other. 
The Missing Ingredient: Comparative History 
This has been a long-winded introduction to my comments on Robert Mar- 
go’s paper, but I think the trip was necessary. American economic historians 
don’t think comparatively as often as European economic historians do. They 
ought to do it more frequently. Such thinking would certainly help assess the 
implications of Margo’s paper. What’s “big” real wage growth? What’s “sig- 
nificant” regional wage integration? Were wages really sticky? How important 
is the omission of  rents from the cost-of-living index? These questions are 
hard to answer without applying a comparative standard, like the one invoked 
in the previous section. Furthermore, the thriving standard of living literature 
on industrializing nineteenth-century Europe might help place the antebellum 
American experience in perspective. Let me  illustrate with  some examples 
from the first industrial revolution. 
First, how  important is the omission of rents from Margo’s cost-of-living 
deflator? Margo is quite aware of the flaws in his cost-of-living index, and he 
takes pains to emphasize similar flaws in other antebellum consumer price 
proxies. These include the unfortunate use of producers’ rather than consum- 
ers’ goods, wholesale rather than retail prices, and tradable goods to the ex- 
clusion of nontradable services. If  the relative price of each was fairly stable 
over time, the flaws can be ignored. But it seems unlikely. One relative price 
that increases sharply during the industrial revolution is rents. There are three 
reasons for this. First, housing construction is labor-intensive, and the relative 
price of labor rises during industrialization-after  all, real wages do rise “sub- 
stantially” during  the  antebellum years.  Second,  urban  housing  is  space- 
intensive, and rising urban land scarcity is a fact of life during all industrial 
revolutions,  past  and  present.  Third,  the  rate  of  total  factor productivity 
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even today (Baumol, Blackman, and Wolff  1989, chap. 4). All of these factors 
should serve to raise the relative cost of housing as industrialization unfolds. 
It is manifested by  a rise in rents, and it is manifested by families saving on 
rental expenditures by moving into smaller dwellings and by  the dwellings 
themselves packing in closer together, events that served to raise nineteenth- 
century mortality and morbidity  while lowering the quality of  life. To  the 
extent that quality-adjusted rents are excluded from the cost-of-living index, 
estimated real wage growth during the antebellum years is overstated in Mar- 
go’s figures. In contrast, the British estimates in table 4C. I include the impact 
of rising rents. 
So much for theory. What about fact? Did the likely rise in city rents serve 
to suppress real wage growth in antebellum America? While such evidence 
may be missing for almost every year covering Margo’s time series 1821-56, 
it is available starting with the late  1850s (Williamson and Lindert  1980, 
chap. 5), so that Margo could assess its contribution to trends in the cost-of- 
living index shortly after the mid-l850s, using such insights to help assess its 
potential impact on  antebellum trends. Furthermore,  such evidence is also 
available for Britain during its industrial revolution (Williamson 1990, 188, 
235-38).  From the 1790s to the 1840s, real rents (nominal rents relative to the 
cost of living) in Leeds, Black Country towns, and a village in Staffordshire 
rose by 2.5 percent per annum, for a whopping 30 percent per decade. Since 
rents accounted for about 20 percent of  the common laborer’s budget, this 
explosion in urban dwelling expense served to raise the cost-of-living growth 
rate by perhaps as much as 0.5 percent per year. If the British experience was 
shared by American cities and towns, Margo’s estimates of real wage growth 
are exaggerated by no small measure. 
Second, while this is a conference on antebellum living standards, Margo’s 
paper only discusses wages. The European economic historian would be sur- 
prised by  this limited focus, since the age-old literature there has included 
debate over urban disamenities, work hours and leisure, safety nets, and un- 
employment incidence, to name only a few. Some of these turn out to matter 
in making assessments about the rate of improvement in living standards (Lin- 
dert and Williamson 1983). Why is American antebellum debate so quiet on 
these issues? 
Third, America isn’t the only country that has a fixation on regions and 
“sections.” While England never had a Frederick Jackson Turner, it has always 
been acutely aware that wages differed across regions during the industrial 
revolution. London always had higher wages than other cities, even after tak- 
ing account of the fact that it was an expensive place to live. And the rural 
south of England had lower real wages than did the rural north. Given these 
regional wage differentials, debates have raged surrounding two issues (just 
as in America): When do truly national labor markets begin to emerge? What 
role did interregional migration play (workers seeking out high-wage labor 
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the first question is that it depends. If  we are talking about cities and large 
towns, then it appears that there was a well-integrated labor market very early 
in  the industrial revolution (Williamson 1990, chap.  5). If  we  are talking 
about farms and rural villages, then the labor market was very poorly inte- 
grated,  and it was  manifested by  rising  farm-city wage  gaps (Williamson 
1990, chap. 7). Was antebellum experience in America any different than ex- 
perience in England from the 1790s to the 1850s? Comparative questions like 
this would enrich our understanding of  American experience with real wage 
performance. 
Fourth, how comprehensive is the occupational coverage offered by Mar- 
go’s  fort wage records? The evidence he (and Georgia Villaflor) extracts so 
skillfully from those wage records deals with the building trades and clerks 
only. There is no evidence from other nonfarm service activities, from farms, 
or from any factories. Thus, Margo’s evidence is relevant to real wage growth 
only if the structure of wages was stable during these antebellum decades of 
dramatic industrialization. While the debate over alleged “wage-stretching” 
between skilled and unskilled labor during early nineteenth-century industrial 
revolutions still rages for both America and Britain, no one in either camp has 
argued that the wage structure was stable. The wage gap between farm and 
city rose sharply in Britain. If the same was true for antebellum America, then 
Margo’s real wage growth estimates are overstated. If  skilled factory wages 
rose relative to the building trades, then Margo’s real wage growth estimates 
are understated. While I applaud Margo’s effort to develop an alternative wage 
data source, caution is warranted in making the leap from statements about 
building wage  trends to  average real  wage  trends.  And  to the extent that 
the  wage  structure  did  change  over  the  antebellum decades,  we  want  to 
know why. 
Sticky Wages? 
Margo spends a number of pages at the end of his admirable survey on wage 
stickiness in the short run. It draws on a collaboration with Claudia Goldin 
(Goldin and Margo  1992), which has been stimulated by similar questions 
raised by macroeconomists on twentieth-century experience. Other American 
economic historians have been doing the same (e.g., see Hanes 1990; James 
1989). The basic finding is this: “Nominal wages did  not adjust instanta- 
neously-when  prices rose, as in the mid-l830s, real wages fell.” Based on 
conventional thinking, macroeconomists will be surprised by this antebellum 
finding. Led by Jeffrey Sachs and Robert Gordon, macroeconomists have per- 
suaded themselves that sticky wages are a twentieth-century phenomenon, 
and that they evolved that way due to the rise of unions and formal unemploy- 
ment  insurance schemes.  Chris Hanes (1990) has  shown this view  to be 
wrong, since sticky wages were on the rise in the late nineteenth century long 
before the appearance of unemployment insurance schemes and when little of 
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the late 1880s: prior to those years, wages in  manufacturing were flexible; 
after those years they became increasingly sticky. Hanes has developed an 
explanation for the institutional evolution that hinges on the increase in firm 
size and concentration along Chandlerian lines. Given these findings, how is 
it that Margo (and Goldin) find wage stickiness in the antebellum decades? 
My role is to pose this question, while I will let those more expert debate 
the answers. However, I cannot resist making two points. 
First, are the cost-of-living figures likely to yield that result by  construc- 
tion? Margo has already listed the flaws in the price index, and they are likely 
to imply far greater instability over booms and busts than would a true cost- 
of-living index. Why? Well, it excludes services like rents, and they are no- 
toriously stable over booms and busts.  And  it also uses wholesale prices, 
rather than retail prices. The former is more unstable over booms and busts 
than the latter, and it’s the latter that’s relevant to wage stickiness tales. And it 
also uses raw material prices (e.g., leather) to proxy consumer goods prices 
(e.g.,  shoes). Once again, the former is more unstable than the latter over 
booms and busts, and it’s the latter that’s relevant to wage stickiness tales. To 
repeat, Margo may have fabricated sticky wages by construction. 
Second, let’s remember whose wages Goldin and Margo are talking about. 
Farm  wages,  based  on  Winifred Rothenberg’s (1988)  Massachusetts evi- 
dence, are not sticky at all, a result that we all thought was true anyway (see 
Hatton and  Williamson  1992 for confirmation on  U.S.  experience  1890- 
1941). Clerks, on the other hand, had sticky wages, a finding that makes sense 
since they were in one of the few occupations that had long-term contracts. 
They also report sticky wages for the building trades drawn from those fort 
wage records. I think Margo should be more cautious at this point. He has to 
persuade me that the result was not constructed. After all, the fort wage data 
are constructed by regression analysis, which minimizes variance. Does that 
fact create an illusion of stickiness that was never present? Furthermore, there 
were missing years and missing forts in the data base that, as I understand it, 
were filled by interpolation. Does that fact also create an illusion of  stickiness 
that never was present? Finally, we should remember that the building trades 
were the first to unionize. That statement applies to cities and not necessarily 
to the forts, but since Margo has already invoked the assumption of competi- 
tive labor markets between the forts and civilian labor markets elsewhere in 
the region, he should find no objection to the statement. Building trade craft 
unions appeared long before the rise of industrial unions late in the century; 
these craft unions were the first to experiment with strikes (and strike threats); 
and these unions were the first to demand no wage cuts during periods of 
industrial crisis. 
So, we must be cautious. Much of the wage stickiness that Margo sees in 
the antebellum period may  be  wage  stickiness in one sector, the building 
trades, and much of the stickiness even there may be by construction. 216  Robert A. Margo 
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